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Abstract
In this paper, we employ what we term as ‘the ethical dimension in political market orientation (PMO)’ framework to under-
line how an integration of information from relevant stakeholder groups can inform the formulation of market-oriented, 
yet ethical policies. Against the backdrop of India’s Look East Policy (LEP), we undertake a critical analysis of historic 
economic data from 1980 to 2014 in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland 
and Tripura, often termed as the Seven Sisters because of their interdependence. Our analysis of the data, using time-series 
methods, reveals that policy changes ensuing from the economic reforms of 1990s and the initiation of the LEP in 1991 
have resulted in regional income convergence in North-Eastern India. A key contribution of our work emanates from the fact 
that we determine two structural breaks endogenously from long time-series data, thereby identifying three distinct policy 
regimes, rather than specifying exogenous breaks based on historic and theoretical conjectures. Overall, our work offers both 
conceptual insights into processes that enable ethical and inclusive policy making, as well as empirical evidence emerging 
from stochastic convergence of incomes per capita for the Seven Sister states in the North-Eastern region in India, to illustrate 
how regional economic inequality can be reduced through targeted market-oriented policies.
Keywords Look East policy · Ethical policy making · Political market orientation · Regional inequality · Stochastic 
convergence · Structural breaks
Introduction
This paper examines how India’s Look East Policy (LEP), 
originally focused on building institutional linkages with 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
strengthening bilateral relations with its member states, also 
resulted in income convergence in its North–Eastern Region 
(NER). The launch of the LEP (1991–2014) coincided with 
a range of economic reforms starting in 1991 and resulting 
from a combination of factors—the collapse of India’s val-
ued economic partner, the Soviet Union and severe financial 
crisis along with a growth in globalisation (Bhaumik 2014; 
Sikri 2009; Choudhury 2010, 2012). It should be noted that 
whilst the LEP was not a direct product of comprehensive 
economic and structural reforms of 1990s (like other policy 
changes, e.g. trade liberalisation and industrial reforms), 
it emerged as an ancillary policy response at a time that 
saw India opening up to the world in the 1990s. Officially 
launched in 1991, the LEP, together with the macro and 
structural reforms of the 1990s, brought about a paradigm 
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shift, unleashing private enterprise that engendered radical 
economic transformation (Haokip 2011).
We examine this shift through the conceptual lens of 
political market orientation (PMO) (see Ormrod 2005; Orm-
rod and Henneberg 2009), focusing in particular on what we 
consider the ethical dimension in PMO, to argue that market-
oriented policies are both dynamic and contribute to ethical 
policy making, as they are informed by the values of relevant 
stakeholder groups (Freeman et al. 2004, 2007). Our work is 
one of the first to engage with the domestic dimension of the 
LEP (i.e. its impact on regional income convergence in the 
context of India’s NER). Indeed, on one hand, market-based 
reforms initiated in 1991 resulted in significant reductions 
in tariff and non-tariff barriers, the pruning of public sector 
monopolies, and an easing of the inflow of foreign direct 
investment. On the other, they led to an ethical reframing 
(i.e. by taking stock of the importance of non-materialist 
aspirations such as inclusion, citizenship and community) 
of economic policy, which acquired a more human face for 
the local populace. The emphasis moved towards gaining 
a deeper understanding of issues such as access, inclusion, 
equity and social justice in the sub-regional connectivity 
projects, aimed at improving the economic integration of the 
NER with national and international markets of South and 
South-East Asia (Ziipao 2018).
In order to grasp the impact of the LEP on the uncon-
nected and underdeveloped communities of the NER, we 
employ a unified analytical framework that combines the 
theoretical context informed by political market orientation 
(PMO) with an empirical approach embedded in work on 
income convergence from the regional economics literature. 
Our cross-disciplinary analysis of historic economic data 
(1980–2014)1 provides unique insights into the impact of 
the LEP on regional convergence of incomes in the NER. 
Although the 1980s precede the LEP, we include data from 
this time period for it acts as the benchmark (i.e. pre-policy 
intervention phase), allowing us to gauge the deep-seated 
nature of economic reforms and the impact of policy inter-
ventions since the 1990s on income convergence in the 
long run. In fact, it will not be unfair to regard the 1980s 
as constituting a ‘policy void’ in the region (see Das 2010). 
During this phase, India relied on a strategy of import sub-
stitution industrialisation (ISI), that saw significant tariff and 
non-tariff protection as well as industrial licensing, which 
favoured larger industrialised states and bypassed the periph-
eral economy of the NER.2 Thus, having the 1980s as the 
basis for our empirical analysis allows us to understand the 
regional income dynamics better and to empirically capture 
the long-term processes of income convergence.3 Against 
this backdrop, the specific research questions examined in 
this paper are as follows:
– What are the key insights provided by the ethical dimen-
sion in PMO in theorising the strategic role and the influ-
ence of key stakeholders in the LEP’s implementation 
processes?
– Did the LEP contribute to improving the economic per-
formance of the NER, as captured through any evidence 
on regional income convergence?
– What strategic lessons can be derived from the LEP’s 
impact on income convergence?
These questions enable us to engage with the LEP’s domes-
tic development angle, which gained precedence as policy 
makers began to view its political potential in bringing about 
an improved connectivity of the NER’s rural underdeveloped 
areas with the rest of India, and as means of closing the 
income gap between the region and the rest of India. We 
use the notion of stochastic convergence that tests, through 
a time-series methodology and using historic data from 1980 
to 2014, whether there is statistical evidence of the lagging 
Seven Sisters of the NER catching-up with the rest of India 
in the long run, in order to ascertain the concurrent impact of 
the LEP and market reforms. The theoretical frame afforded 
by the PMO helps us to gauge dynamic socio-economic pro-
cesses evolving over time as a result of reform-oriented poli-
cies, shaped by the values of a range of stakeholders and 
1 The data we use are based on financial years from 1980–81 until 
2014–2015, but for brevity we refer to this time period as 1980–2014 
in the rest of the paper.
2 Economic policies prior to 1991 were more favourable towards 
states in mainland India (ignoring the peripheral NER states). For 
example, heavy industries were supported in larger states like Kar-
nataka (Hindustan Aeronautics Limited—HAL was set up in 1964 
3 Income convergence in economics is a long-run phenomenon, 
which requires long time-series data to be captured appropriately. 
Our data include a pre-liberalisation period (1980s) and a post-liber-
alisation period (1990s and 2000s), which makes it possible to test 
for income convergence in the long run, and to capture the effect of 
reforms (macro and structural reforms in the 1990s for all states in 
India and implementation of the LEP in the 2000s for the states in 
the NER) through structural breaks in our income convergence tests 
(see, Chatterji and Choudhury 2013). Additionally, long time-series 
increases the statistical power of the tests employed in this paper to 
account for structural breaks, making the results more robust and reli-
able (Choudhury and Hawes 2014).
by the government of India in Bangalore and continuously expanded 
operational facilities in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Uttar 
Pradesh, through the 1970s and 1980s), Orissa (National Aluminium 
Company Limited—NALCO was set up in 1981), Delhi (Bharat 
Heavy Industries Limited—BHEL was first set up in Delhi in 1964 
and its manufacturing facilities were expanded to other Indian main-
land states including Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, 
Uttar Pradesh and other states throughout the 1970s and 1980s). 
Similarly, green revolution initiated in the mid- to late-1960s mainly 
targeted and benefitted North and North-Western states like Punjab, 
Haryana and Uttar Pradesh throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
Footnote 2 (continued)
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their interface (Bathelt and Glückler 2003, 2011; Pandey 
and Gupta 2016).
Conceptual Framework
Political Market Orientation
We employ key tenets of the PMO framework (see Ormrod 
2006, 2014; Ormrod and Henneberg 2009; Ormrod and Sav-
igny 2011) to theorise multi-faceted-political, strategic and 
economic-stakeholder relationships impacting upon the LEP. 
Broadly, the research on market orientation (MO) provides 
the conceptual basis for PMO (see Jaworski and Kohli 1993; 
Kohli et al. 1993; Narver and Slater 1990). The term MO, 
first coined by Levitt (1960), denotes a set of norms focused 
on assessing and acting on customers’ needs, plus predicting 
and responding to competitors’ conduct, to exploit oppor-
tunities and circumvent threats (Kohli and Jaworski 1990; 
Morgan and Strong 1998). We consider the PMO appropri-
ate in the context of our work due to the inadequacy of the 
MO concept to engage with and address long-term stake-
holder interests because of an overemphasis on maximising 
short-term profitability (Kirca et al. 2005). In contrast, the 
PMO helps to engage with the impact of market-oriented 
policies on various stakeholders, as well as map the result-
ing progress towards responsible democratic governance. 
In fact, by adopting the PMO perspective in examining the 
market-oriented policy focus of the LEP aimed at opening 
up of the economy, we respond to authors’ call for a need to 
integrate political science and marketing research streams 
(see Coleman 2007; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Wring 1997).
Indeed, the PMO allows a deeper understanding of how 
policies leverage their marketing acumen for the welfare 
of relevant stakeholders. The main emphasis of Ormrod’s 
(2005) conceptualisation of PMO lies in the significance it 
accords to political party members’ values and their orien-
tation towards specific stakeholder groups. Thus, from this 
perspective, a PMO is conceived to exist:
… when all members of a party are sensitive to internal 
and external stakeholders’ attitudes, needs and wants, 
and synthesise these within a framework of constraints 
imposed by all stakeholders to develop policies and 
programmes with which to reach the party’s objectives 
(Ormrod 2005, p. 51).
This conceptualisation facilitates a link between two 
research areas of political marketing and societal marketing 
(see Fig. 1). In the context of our focus on the market-ori-
ented dimension of the LEP, we extend Ormrod’s definition 
to include both party and policy objectives, respectively. We 
argue that the successful implementation of a party’s agenda 
or a policy affects (and is affected) by a multitude of meso-, 
micro- and macro-level stakeholders, not just voters (Bhat-
tacharya and Korschun 2008; Fritzsche 1991; Hoeffler and 
Keller 2002). Indeed, as we demonstrate in our analysis, the 
LEP’s multi-faceted and multi-pronged approach to estab-
lish strategic links with macro-level stakeholders such as 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members 
worked in conjunction with a greater sensitivity towards and 
a focus on strengthening meso- and micro-level bodies in the 
NER such as the State Governments, the NGO sector and the 
grassroots level groups (Naidu 2004).
In general, Ormrod’s (2005, 2007) PMO model consists 
of eight constructs—four being attitudinal and the other 
four behavioural (see Table 1). Together, attitudinal and 
behavioural constructs serve as means to engage with dif-
ferent stakeholder groups in bringing about the execution 
of market-oriented policies as summarised in Fig. 1. The 
emphasis on addressing the needs of a variety of stakehold-
ers and securing the best possible outcomes for them consti-
tutes what we regard as ‘the ethical dimension in PMO’ (see 
Fig. 1). Thus, the Internal Orientation (IO) is inclusive, as 
policy goals and/or party agenda are disseminated to mem-
bers irrespective of their rank within the party. Whilst the 
Voter Orientation (VO) is responsive, as policies respond 
to and are guided by the needs of the general public, the 
Competitor Orientation (CO) is characterised by resilience, 
as any policy success is dependent on stakeholders’ sup-
port and their commitment to execute market-oriented poli-
cies despite a regime change. Stakeholder Orientation (SO) 
towards meso-level stakeholders is one of adaptive collabo-
ration, for they not only influence the policy outcome, but 
can also provide valuable feedback at the policy formulation 
stage. The macro-level stakeholders add value and extend 
the reach of policies and/or a party’s vision, a compliance 
with micro-level stakeholders’ priorities contributes to their 
capacity building and participation.
As such, we extend the theoretical understanding around 
PMO to regard it as composite of stakeholders’ values and 
concerns that provide an overarching thrust towards market-
oriented policies, which are both progressive and ethical. We 
consider what we conceptualise as ‘the ethical dimension 
in PMO’ (Fig. 1) to engage with processes underlying the 
market-oriented nature of policy making. Our theorising of 
the ethical dimension in PMO foregrounds the need for an 
emphasis on a longer term and more permanent strategic 
relationship-building with key stakeholders operating at 
different levels, as opposed to short-term tactics aimed at 
conducting market research (often prior to an election) to 
identify voters’ priorities. Indeed, the LEP, by focusing on 
dynamism—both at domestic and regional levels—engaged 
with a multitude of societal actors, not just voters (Jaffre-
lot 2003). In fact, the market-oriented policy ethos inherent 
in the LEP helped dilute partisan preferences in favour of 
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policies that were inclusive and informed by stakeholders’ 
concerns.
The Ethical Dimension in PMO 
and the Market‑Oriented Thrust of the LEP
The ethical dimension in PMO is well suited to serve as 
the conceptual basis for engaging with the market-oriented 
thrust of the LEP, due to the framework it offers in engaging 
with multiple stakeholders and reach a synthesis within the 
context of constraints imposed by them to develop policies 
and programmes that are capable of addressing long-term 
developmental goals. Indeed, the LEP provided the Indian 
government and, to a lesser extent private Indian corpora-
tions, an integrated approach to infuse the NER’s sluggish 
economy with dynamism resulting in lucrative contracts 
for industrial and infrastructure projects, including the con-
struction of highways, pipelines and ports (Goldberg 2017). 
Further, in order to engage with the LEP’s wider orientation 
towards society, we consider two related sub-constructs (fol-
lowing O’Cass and Voola 2011)—proactive political market 
orientation (PPMO) and reactive political market orientation 
(RPMO).
Our contention is that market-oriented policies, which 
are PPMO-driven, are more likely to address not only the 
expressed, but the latent needs of the electorate in a region, 
due to their better fit with priorities and preferences of lead 
stakeholders. Also, they are capable of driving the market by 
“… trying to actively convince others of the beneficial nature 
of the political offer” (Henneberg 2006, p. 31). Since PPMO 
involves researching and imagining latent needs through a 
“probe-and-learn” process, policy making is dependent upon 
and is informed by a broad range of sources that enable it to 
overcome prior limitations, as well as engage in experimen-
tation in order to formulate creative solutions to issues (Atu-
ahene-Gima et al. 2005). It is no coincidence that the initia-
tion of the LEP overlapped with wider pro-market macro 
and structural reforms of the 1990s aimed at improving the 
NER’s economic competency and productivity. Indeed, the 
emphasis of the LEP to link the NER’s rural belt—espe-
cially, facilitating the connectivity of local markets—with 
regional, national and international markets, helped the 
Fig. 1  The ethical dimension 
in PMO. Source Adapted from 
(Ormrod 2014; Ormrod and 
Henneberg 2009). Notes SO 
stakeholder orientation
Internal Orientation 
Inclusive, as there is not only 
party-wide awareness, but also 
an acceptance of other 
members’ values and opinions, 
irrespective of their position 
within the party
Informaon 
Generaon
Voter Orientation
Responsive, as an 
acknowledgement and 
awareness of voter needs 
enables parties to identify 
‘gaps’ in the product offerings 
(i.e. policies) and adopt the 
most suitable ones accordingly 
Meso-level SO 
Adaptive collaboration, as 
meso level action groups both 
influence the outcome of an 
intervention and provide 
feedback to the policy 
formulation process  
Informaon 
Disseminaon
Member 
Parcipaon 
Consistent 
Strategy 
Implementaon
Competitor Orientation
Resilience, as an 
accommodation of other 
parties’ priorities and goals is 
critical in achieving their 
cooperation and attaining the 
party’s long-term vision 
Macro-level SO 
Added value, derived from a 
comprehensive network of 
stakeholders from different 
policy fields and commitment 
to varying issues 
Micro-level SO
Compliant, as adapting the 
party-wide agenda and / or 
welfare policies to grassroots 
level priorities establishes the 
role of political parties as 
facilitators of democratic 
participation 
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region to emerge as a strategically crucial region (Ziipao 
2018). The PPMO thrust of the LEP and the wider reforms 
of the 1990s resulted in significant competitive advantage for 
the NER, because of its focus on continually improving pro-
ductivity and efficiency to facilitate the region’s ‘catching-
up’ process with the national economy.
In contrast, the RPMO is a damage-repair strategy and is 
put into place to either ward off the potential negative effects 
of past policies or implement change until it is absolutely 
necessary (see Barney 1991 for similar reasoning in com-
mercial context). Thus, it is ad hoc in nature and activated 
(often without prior debate and consultation) in response to a 
crisis, with an emphasis on how policy mechanism can best 
handle the fallout from unpopular policies (Banks, 1999). 
Authors describe crisis situations variously as “windows of 
opportunities” (Kingdon 1964, p. 62) or “critical junctures” 
(Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, p. 341) that can be exploited 
politically to push forward radical reforms. To a large extent, 
the LEP was implemented in response to a crisis, namely 
as a measure to alleviate various kinds of social, economic 
and political handicaps of the peripheral and landlocked 
NER (Srikanth 2016). There was a lack of consensus on 
policy outcomes and a resource scarcity, resulting in trade-
offs between conflicting demands and priorities (Lindblom 
1980). Nevertheless, the acceleration in implementing the 
development-oriented thrust of the LEP in the 2000s paved 
the way for infrastructure development within the NER and 
opened up possibilities for sub-regional cooperation with 
neighbouring countries (Ziipao 2018).
In general, we underline the complementary nature of 
both PPMO and RPMO that together contribute to sustaining 
the ethical dimension in the PMO and in bringing about the 
competitive advantage of a region (O’Cass and Voola 2011; 
Reid 1988). The ethical dimension in PMO affords ‘legiti-
macy’ to different stakes (including the ones of the less pow-
erful stakeholders) and the fact that even if various groups 
are not necessary for the implementation of market-oriented 
policies, three critical elements—power, legitimacy and 
urgency (Mitchell et al. 1997)—pertaining to stakeholders 
are critical to their long-term success. Whilst power refers 
to their influence over others, legitimacy relates to values, 
norms and patterns of behaviour that define stakeholders 
who have a claim or interest in market-oriented policies, 
and urgency serves as the catalyst that brings about a debate 
and possible conflict resolution in the policy implementation 
processes (Maignan et al. 2007).
We now consider the LEP’s domestic dimension, focus-
ing on how market-oriented reforms resulted in new ‘prod-
uct offerings’ (i.e. policies) that facilitated the income con-
vergence in the NER. We employ the ethical dimension in 
PMO (encompassing both PPMO and RPMO) to illustrate 
the LEP’s impact on the lagging economies of Seven Sisters.
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Background, Context, Methodology 
and Data
The LEP and the NER
The economically lagging NER’s only land link with the rest 
of India is through a narrow sliver of land—“the ‘Chicken’s 
Neck’ near Siliguri” (Kathuria 2017)—due to Bangladesh’s 
reluctance to give transit facilities to India.4 Thus, one of 
the key focus areas of the LEP was to intensify the region’s 
economic links with Myanmar and other Southeast Asian 
countries, in order to reduce its overwhelming dependence 
on Bangladesh. In fact, the NER is considered as India’s 
gateway to Southeast Asia, as it shares 98 per cent of its 
border with Myanmar, Bangladesh, China, and Bhutan, 
and has transport and trading corridors present at various 
border points (Toppo 2016). This makes the NER strategi-
cally significant and vital not only for India’s future eco-
nomic growth, but also for its aspirations to assume global 
leadership.
Given this context, the state governments of Seven Sis-
ters, hitherto excluded from the decision-making process, 
were recognised as key stakeholders in the larger Asian inte-
gration process. The vision document for the LEP expressly 
vocalised its commitment to elevate their economic status 
through alleviating poverty and reducing inequality. In fact, 
under the classification of Special Category States status, 
the NER has benefited from generous Government of India 
(GOI) funding. The per capita gross disbursement of central 
assistance by the GOI in 2012–2013 was Rupees 13,325.77 
for the NER, as compared with Rupees 7047.47 in other 
states (Bhattacharya 2014). Since 2000, 49 new National 
Highways have been initiated in the NER, which are now 
at various stages of completion (Sangwan 2016). In fact, 
within the development discourse in the NER, infrastructure 
provides a basis for gaining an understanding of, and acting 
upon issues of access, inclusion, equity and social justice 
(Ziipao 2018).
Since the local populace at large (e.g. residents, non-profit 
sector and the wider business community) was set to ben-
efit from the LEP and had a significant stake in its effective 
implementation, it acquired the status of a key stakeholder. 
A number of projects in horticulture, fisheries and live-
stock (which still continue) were sponsored with a view to 
generate income and jobs in the region. The Department of 
Development of the North Eastern Region (DONER), set 
up by the GOI in September 2001, was accorded the status 
of a full-fledged ministry in May 2004, to act as a facilita-
tor between the central government and the state govern-
ments of the NER. The aim was that it would accelerate 
the pace of socio-economic development in the region, so 
that it may enjoy growth parity with the rest of the country 
(Planning Commission, GOI 2013). Additionally, the North 
Eastern Council (NEC), first established in 1971 through the 
North Eastern Council Act of 1971, was elevated from an 
advisory body to a full-fledged ‘regional planning body’ in 
2002 through the North Eastern Council (Amendment) Act 
of 2002. The NEC has played a crucial role in raising the 
profile and accelerating the implementation of the LEP for 
the benefit of the NER in the 2000s, as reflected in the NER 
Vision 2020 policy document, published jointly by the NEC 
and Ministry of DONER in 2008. Further, in a bid to sup-
port local agency and enterprise, the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) constituted a committee known as the Financial Sector 
Plan for the NER in 2006, to strengthen linkages between 
banks and self-help groups. The entrepreneurial nature of 
this model and the extensive use of information technology 
to facilitate off-site banking were instrumental in securing 
finance for small firms and start-ups (Sangwan 2016).
Additionally, since the establishment of commercial 
links between the NER and neighbouring states of Myan-
mar and Bangladesh were crucial to engage in and benefit 
from international trade, therefore foreign governments were 
also recognised as key stakeholders. The LEP facilitated 
India’s involvement in a variety of cross-border develop-
ment projects with Myanmar, Thailand, Bhutan and Vietnam 
in diverse fields such as roads, railways, telecommunica-
tions, IT, science and technology and power (Das 2010). 
With time, as India acquired credibility as a rising Asian 
power and an important potential economic partner, the 
LEP elicited a serious response from ASEAN and other 
East Asian countries (Sikri 2009). For instance, in 2002, 
India became a Summit-level Dialogue Partner of ASEAN 
and implemented steps to establish free-trade agreement in 
goods, services and investment over the next decade. Thus, 
the LEP not only strengthened India’s relationship with 
ASEAN, but also facilitated the country’s bilateral ties with 
individual ASEAN countries, promoting greater awareness 
of the potential for trade, tourism and micro-level ties.
In general, the LEP appeared to be guided by the ethical 
dimension in PMO (see Fig. 1), with the potential to act as 
a bridge between stakeholders and proved instrumental in 
engaging both the local populace and state governments. 
However, fiscal indiscipline, abysmal levels of corruption 
and misappropriation of funds limited its impact (Chatterjee 
2014). The LEP ended up benefiting large traders, industrial-
ists and highly qualified professionals, rather than resulting 
4 This is set to change as close cooperation between Bangladesh 
and India (including various ongoing initiatives such as the trans-
shipment of Indian goods through Bangladesh’s Ashuganj port to 
Northeast India, the expansion of rail links within Northeast India 
and between the two countries as well as the BBIN Motor Vehicles 
Agreement), as part of the broader LEP initiative, is set to dramati-
cally reduce the cost of transport between the NER and the rest of 
India.
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in widespread employment generation (ICWA 2015). Also, 
the lack of sustainable and equitable benefit-sharing and 
consistent dialogue between the NER state governments 
weakened the acceptance of the LEP as a long-term strat-
egy aimed at bringing about market reforms (Naidu 2001). 
On the foreign front, the macro-level SO of the LEP pro-
vided the basis for the consolidation of India’s ties with its 
neighbours, with a particular emphasis on economic growth. 
However, for foreign regimes, India’s failure to spell out its 
interests, concerns and strategic stakes resulted in consid-
erable confusion, especially in Southeast Asia (Chatterjee 
2007). Despite these limitations, we argue that the LEP’s 
grounding in the ethical dimension in PMO and its explicit 
reference to the importance of stakeholders in the imple-
mentation of the development agenda throughout the 2000s, 
indirectly resulted in a modest increase in incomes per capita 
in the NER.
Against this backdrop of gradual and incremental pol-
icy changes in the 1990s (macro and structural reforms 
and initiation of the LEP) and 2000s (implementation and 
intensification of specific LEP instruments targeting the 
development of the NER), we examine and engage with the 
dynamics of income convergence within the region, as well 
as the convergence of the region to the rest of India in terms 
of incomes per capita. We discuss stochastic convergence 
and its implications in the context of income disparity in the 
NER in the following section.
Income Disparity in the NER
In general, disparity in incomes per capita between regions 
may simply reflect differences in natural or purely eco-
nomic conditions, due to differences in geography, natural 
endowments and infrastructural links. For the purpose of 
this paper, we call such differences in per capita incomes 
as ‘compensating differentials’.5 Income differentials might 
also arise from policy differences at the state/regional level. 
This works through the ability (or lack thereof) of states 
to generate rents through advantageous discretionary poli-
cies, reflected as some kind of premium (or loss) in their per 
capita incomes, which may either offset or complement the 
‘compensating differentials’.
India’s ISI strategy prior to 1991 favoured larger states in 
the rest of India, and overlooked the peripheral NER, lead-
ing to a policy void in the region during the 1980s, result-
ing in premiums (for larger states) and/or losses (for NER 
states), respectively. In a highly protected economy, restric-
tive inward-looking import substitution policies and planned 
industrialisation through industrial licensing often created 
economic (market) distortions, and hence states would be 
expected to generate substantial amount of economic rents.6 
In the Indian case, the bigger states in India favoured through 
inward-looking ISI policy in the 1980s were potentially in a 
position to generate greater rents compared to the peripheral, 
landlocked and isolated Seven Sisters that remained outside 
any major policy sphere, resulting in their divergence away 
from national trends in incomes per capita. Under such a 
distorted policy regime, inter-state income differences poten-
tially reflected the varying rent-generation capacity of states, 
rather than true ‘compensating differentials’. However, as a 
result of market-based economic reforms, including trade 
liberalisation and industrial deregulation, state rents expe-
rienced a decrease and inter-state income per capita differ-
ences (stochastically) converged towards ‘compensating dif-
ferentials’ (see following section on stochastic convergence).
This process was enhanced further by additional directed 
and corrective policies which set the development agenda for 
the NER as part of the LEP in 1991 and implemented in the 
2000s. In fact, the LEP embodied both PPMO, because of its 
role in facilitating market reforms and dialogue across sec-
tors, as well as RPMO, as policy-change processes appeared 
to be implemented in an ad hoc manner without adequate 
consultation in response to the NER’s economic crisis. Nev-
ertheless, it served as an opportunity for stakeholders in the 
region to jointly work at addressing the negative impact of 
political neglect and embrace economic growth. Indeed, 
from the state income per capita perspective for each of the 
seven states and the NER as a whole, juxtaposed against the 
average Indian income per capita for the period 1980–2014, 
modest growth is evident (Fig. 2).5 We borrow the term ‘compensating differentials’ from labour eco-
nomics. According to the theory of the “compensating differentials” 
(also called the theory of equalising differentials), individual work-
ers are induced to accept less attractive jobs by compensating differ-
ences in their wage rates. For a review of the compensating differ-
entials hypothesis, see Rosen (1986). In this paper, we use the term 
‘compensating differentials’ loosely to indicate inter-state differences 
in state incomes due to natural or economic conditions. For example, 
relatively inhospitable and inaccessible terrain in Arunachal Pradesh 
in comparison to the fertile soils of Assam reflect natural differences 
between production capacities/environment between these states, 
which may explain differences in income per capita. We use the term 
‘compensating differentials’ in this paper to capture such differentials 
in incomes per capita among states due to economic geography fac-
tors.
6 A distortion is any departure from the ideal economic system and it 
therefore interferes with the process of economic agents maximising 
social welfare when they maximise their own (Deardorff 2014). Rent-
seeking refers to all largely unproductive, expropriative activities, 
which bring positive return to the individual agent but not to soci-
ety as a whole (Krueger 1974). Rent-seeking results in reduced eco-
nomic efficiency through poor allocation of resources, reduced actual 
wealth-creation, lost government revenue, increased income inequal-
ity and (potentially) national decline (Dabla-Norris and Wade 2001).
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Overall, the cross-comparison presents a mixed picture—
on one hand, states like Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, 
Mizoram and Tripura that started with incomes per capita 
below that of the all India average as well as below the NER 
average in 1980 ended up surpassing the NER average and 
advanced towards the all India average by the end of 2014. 
On the other hand, whilst both Assam and Nagaland started 
off better than the NER average, but below the Indian aver-
age in 1980, only Nagaland managed to surpass both the 
NER and the Indian average by the end of 2014. Similarly, 
Manipur that started off worse than the NER average ended 
up with a per capita income in 2014 that was below both 
the NER and the Indian average. Finally, the figure shows 
that the income per capita for the NER as a whole seemed 
to have diverged away from that of India over the period 
1980–2014. This makes it imperative to statistically test for 
any evidence for convergence (or divergence) of incomes 
per capita across these states and between these states and 
India plus between the NER as a whole and India. This is 
especially crucial because the market reforms of the 1990s 
(including the announcement of the LEP) and the imple-
mentation of the LEP in the 2000s, embodying PPMO and 
RPMO, may have permanently affected the long-run time 
paths of incomes per capita for each individual state relative 
to the region as a whole as well as the national average. As 
such, and allowing for heterogeneity across states, we expect 
two state-specific structural breaks—one in the 1990s cap-
turing the effect of PPMO embodied in the initiation of the 
LEP in 1991 along with structural economic reforms, and 
one in the 2000s capturing the effect of RPMO embodied 
in the implementation of various instruments of the LEP. 
In fact, ignoring structural breaks in our testing procedure 
for income convergence may result in the erroneous conclu-
sion of stochastic divergence of state incomes per capita—a 
point that we elaborate further in our methodology in the 
following section.
Methodology: Testing for Stochastic Convergence
We make use of long historical time-series data to test for 
(stochastic) convergence of incomes per capita, to demon-
strate the effects of the reforms and initiation of the LEP in 
the 1990s and the implementation of development instru-
ments of the LEP in the NER during the 2000s, which 
embody PPMO and RPMO, respectively, as outlined in 
the preceding sections. To test for regional income conver-
gence, the existing literature relies predominantly on cross-
sectional growth equations, following in the tradition estab-
lished by Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
However, recent advances in time-series methods and the 
availability of long time-series data have made it possible 
to examine stochastic convergence of incomes, by using 
powerful unit root tests capturing any potential structural 
breaks (that can be endogenously determined from the data) 
caused by major socio-economic events like policy interven-
tions of the 1990s and 2000s as described above (Chatterji 
and Choudhury 2013). The time-series approach to income 
convergence relies on a methodology proposed by Carlino 
and Mills (1993), who, along with Quah (1993), questioned 
the validity of cross-sectional studies focusing solely on 
beta convergence. A commonly raised objection against the 
cross-sectional approach is that it assumes that all states are 
growing at the same rate, and converging towards the same 
steady-state, whilst ignoring any issues which might arise 
from non-stationarity. Carlino and Mills (1993), in their 
seminal paper examining regional income convergence in 
the United States between eight geographical regions, tested 
whether relative income series were stationary, that is if they 
exhibited mean reversion.
This approach overcomes the limitations of cross-sec-
tional growth equations by allowing for the presence of 
‘compensating differentials’, which would incorporate the 
effects of state-specific characteristics, such as the levels of 
human and physical capital, infrastructure and investment, 
and would allow for different steady-states. Also, it does not 
require the strict assumption of a uniform growth rate across 
all states, but it addresses the problem of non-stationarity 
through stochastic convergence. This is because even if per 
capita incomes within a country exhibit beta convergence yet 
stochastic divergence, as would be evidenced by the pres-
ence of a unit root in the relative series, then even though 
poorer states are growing faster than richer ones, any exog-
enous shocks would lead to a persistent income differential, 
preventing ‘true’ convergence.
Our methodology of testing for “stochastic convergence” 
of incomes per capita for the NER states in India therefore 
follows the time-series methodology suggested in Carlino 
and Mills (1993).7 In the case of individual states, we con-
sider the convergence of per capita state incomes vis-à-vis 
population weighted average income in Seven Sisters and 
the national average of income per capita. In the case of 
Fig. 2  Income per capita for the Seven Sisters, NER and India, 
1980–2014. Source Authors’ calculations based on data from MoSPI, 
GoI. Notes The vertical axis measures incomes per capita in Indian 
rupees in constant 2004–2005 prices. The series labelled NE is the 
population weighted average income per capita for the NER. The 
series labelled INDIA is the national average income per capita for 
India. AP, Megh, Mizo, Naga and Trip stand for Arunachal Pradesh, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura, respectively
◂
7 We outline a more technical exposition of the stochastic income 
convergence approach and our methodology to test for stochastic con-
vergence in a separate Online Appendix, as suggested by one of the 
anonymous referees for the paper.
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the NER as a whole, we consider the convergence of the 
seven states’ population weighted average per capita income 
converging to the Indian average per capita income. In the 
case of individual states, “stochastic convergence” implies 
that shocks to incomes per capita in any state “s” relative 
to the average income per capita in all seven states, will be 
temporary. For each of the seven states “s”, we examine the 
null hypothesis that real income per capita are diverging and 
test for a unit root in the log of the ratio of real income per 
capita relative to the population weighted average income 
per capita for the seven states. A failure to reject the unit root 
null provides evidence against convergence of incomes per 
capita among states. In this case, following a shock to rela-
tive real income per capita in state “s” there is no tendency 
for real income per capita to return to the (weighted) aver-
age, which would imply that state incomes diverge.
In contrast, the rejection of a unit root supports the alter-
native hypothesis that shocks in relative incomes per capita 
are temporary, which implies that incomes converge. If we 
include a constant term in the test, then stochastic conver-
gence (as described above) implies that real incomes per 
capita converge to a state-specific ‘compensating differen-
tial’, meaning that stochastic convergence is consistent with 
‘conditional convergence’ (Strazicich et al. 2004). To test if 
the Seven Sisters are converging to the Indian average, we 
examine the same null, but in this case, use the log of the 
ratio of real income per capita relative to the Indian average. 
Whilst to test for the convergence of the entire NER to the 
Indian average, we rely on the log of the ratio of the seven-
states population weighted average real income per capita 
relative to the Indian average instead.
To perform our tests for stochastic convergence, we con-
sider the time-series characteristics of three different rela-
tive income series—Y1t, capturing the relative income of an 
individual state to that of the NER average; Y2t, capturing 
the relative income of an individual state to that of the Indian 
national average; and, Y3t, capturing the relative income of 
the NER as a whole to that of the Indian national average 
(see following data section on how these variables are con-
structed). Testing for stochastic convergence of incomes per 
capita means that we test if our state series, Y1t or Y2t, is 
stationarity or not. We proceed by testing if any of our series 
contain a unit root. If we can reject the unit root hypothesis 
for a given state “s”, then we have sufficient evidence to 
conclude that state “s” stochastically converged towards the 
regional average, as in the case of Y1t, or towards the Indian 
average, as in the case of Y2t. Similarly, rejecting a unit root 
null for the Y3t series would unequivocally imply that the 
NER on average has stochastically converged to the Indian 
average in terms of per capita incomes over the period of 
study, suggesting a fall in regional income inequality for 
this region.
The main issue when it comes to testing for stochastic 
convergence is the question of which unit root tests to use. 
Perron’s (1989) seminal work on unit root testing demon-
strated that the omission of structural breaks can increase the 
likelihood of a false rejection of the unit root null hypothesis. 
To remedy this situation, Perron allowed for one known (or 
exogenous) structural break (intercept break, slope break 
or both—Model A, Model B or Model C, respectively, in 
Perron 1989) in the ADF unit root test. Despite the pioneer-
ing nature of his methodology, Perron’s assumption of the 
known (exogenous) break date has been the subject of severe 
criticism in the literature, as the reliance on a known break 
date can lead to ‘pre-testing’ the data, which would be a 
form of ‘data mining’. Since then, the subsequent literature 
addressed this problem of the known break date by adopting 
a completely agnostic approach, where a comprehensive and 
systematic search is done to endogenously determine the 
break date (see Perron 2005). The literature also comple-
ments this by allowing for more than one break in the testing 
procedure.
However, in spite of the similarity in the assumption of 
the endogenous break(s), there are methodological differ-
ences among some of these tests. In this paper, we use sev-
eral unit root tests including the conventional Augmented 
Dicky–Fuller (ADF), Phillips–Perron (PP), Schmidt–Phil-
lips (SP) and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) 
tests. However, the test that we mainly rely upon is the 
Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) test proposed by Lee and Stra-
zicich (2003, 2004, respectively, for the one and two breaks 
test). As emphasised in preceding sections, we hypothesise 
that since our data covers 35 years in total from 1980 to 
2014, two breaks are satisfactory from a statistical point 
of view. Our a priori expectations, based on the reform 
period of the 1990s (including the initiation of LEP) and 
the implementation of LEP in the 2000s embodying PPMO 
and RPMO, would also suggest the presence of no more 
than two significant structural breaks. The advantage of this 
test is that the critical values are derived whilst assuming no 
break(s) under the null. Whilst other endogenous break(s) 
tests, such as those undertaken by Zivot and Andrews (1992) 
and Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), may conclude that a time-
series is trend-stationary, when in fact the series is non-sta-
tionary with break(s), the Lee and Strazicich tests avoid any 
potential ‘spurious rejections’ of the null. In contrast to other 
unit root tests which incorporate endogenously determined 
break date(s), the size properties of these test are unaffected 
by breaks under the null. As such, these tests are not sub-
ject to rejections of the null in the presence of a unit root 
with break(s). Thus, results using these LM tests are more 
revealing, since a rejection of the null in favour of trend-sta-
tionarity with one/two break(s) unambiguously implies sto-
chastic convergence. The test implies that the shocks of the 
same percentage common to all states would leave relative 
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real incomes per capita unchanged. Therefore, any struc-
tural break(s) identified would be state-specific. In terms of 
convergence, any identified structural break would imply a 
permanent change in a state’s ‘compensating differential’.
Data: Sources, Construction of Variables 
and Descriptive Statistics
The data on net state domestic product (NSDP) in current 
and constant Indian rupees as well as population figures for 
the Seven Sister states were collected from the Ministry of 
Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), Gov-
ernment of India. Using these figures, with those in con-
stant rupees being based on different base periods, we con-
structed our deflators through splicing the different series to 
generate a continuous deflator series with the base year of 
2004–2005. A continuous series was then created for real 
NSDP in constant 2004–2005 rupees from 1980–1981 to 
2014–2015 (referred to as 1980–2014 elsewhere in the paper 
for brevity), by deflating the respective nominal series based 
on current rupees by the constructed deflators.8 Real per cap-
ita figures were obtained by dividing the continuous series in 
2004–2005 constant rupees by the population figures. This 
serves as our measure for real income per capita for the 
Seven Sisters. Meanwhile, the average Indian net domestic 
product in 2004–2005 constant rupees was readily available 
from MoSPI and only needed to be divided by Indian popu-
lation data to achieve per capita figures.9
Using the real income per capita data for the seven states 
as constructed above, relative real income per capita series 
were created, giving us the following three variables of inter-
est. i.e.
where Y1t is real NSDP per capita for each of the seven states 
relative to the seven-states population weighted average, Y2t 
is real NSDP per capita for each of the seven states relative 
to the Indian average and Y3t is the real seven states popula-
tion weighted NSDP per capita relative to the Indian aver-
age, with all three series expressed in natural logarithms.
Descriptive statistics for real NSDP per capita for each 
of the seven states as well as for the seven states population 
weighted average and for the Indian average are presented 
in Table 2. During the period 1980 to 2014, only Nagaland 
demonstrated a mean value above that of the Indian average. 
This is in spite of the fact that three states showed a higher 
maximum NSDP per capita during this period when com-
pared to the Indian average series (Mizoram, Nagaland and 
Tripura). An explanation for this lies in the strong growth of 
per capita incomes in these states during the latter part of the 
period under consideration, which is indicated by the higher 
positive skewness relative to the Indian average. Another 
salient observation emerging from the descriptive statistics 
is the number of states which have a mean value above the 
seven states population weighted average’s mean (five out 
of the seven states). This can be attributed to the dominance 
(1)Y1t = ln
(
Real NSDP per capitat
Population weighted real average NSDP per capita for the NERt
)
∀s, s = 1−7, t = 1980−2014,
(2)Y2t = ln
(
Real NSDP per capitat
Real Indian average NSDP per capitat
)
∀s, s = 1 − 7, t = 1980 − 2014,
(3)Y3t = ln
(
Population weighted real average NSDP per capita for the NERt
Real Indian average NSDP per capitat
)
, t = 1980 − 2014,
8 The State Domestic Product (SDP) values in constant rupees for 
Mizoram were unavailable until 1999, therefore the Nagaland deflator 
was used for Mizoram for the period 1980–1998, as that series exhib-
ited the strongest correlation with the Mizoram deflator series during 
1999–2014.
9 It is to be noted that the net state domestic product (NSDP) used 
in this paper is net of indirect taxes. The corresponding gross state 
domestic product (GSDP)  figures were also available from MoSPI 
and we have constructed continuous GSDP series as well. We have 
undertaken all tests of convergence for these GSDP data as reported 
for the series constructed using the NSDP data in the results section 
on this paper. The results and key findings are essentially unchanged, 
which therefore acts as a robustness check for our results. We do 
not report them for brevity, but these results are available from the 
authors upon request.
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of relatively poor Assam when calculating the population 
weighted average, as in any given year it contains at least 
67% of the total population of the Seven Sisters; however, 
this figure has steadily fell throughout the period, starting 
from 72% in 1980.
Results and Discussion
Stochastic Convergence Tests Results and Key 
Findings
As previously stated, three different sets of variables are 
used, the natural log of income per capita for each state rela-
tive to the seven states population weighted average income 
per capita  (Y1t) and relative to the Indian average income 
per capita  (Y2t), as well as the natural log of the seven states 
population weighted average income per capita relative to 
the Indian average income per capita (Y3t). Evidence for the 
presence of a unit root in a series would suggest that state or 
regional incomes per capita are diverging; whilst the absence 
of a unit root would signal that incomes per capita are sto-
chastically converging towards their individual steady-states, 
suggesting the effectiveness of the LEP in terms of its devel-
opment agenda for the NER.
The results of the conventional unit root tests, which 
do not account for any breaks in the data, are presented 
in Table 3 as the benchmark. These are the Augmented 
Dicky–Fuller (ADF), Phillips–Perron (PP), Schmidt–Phil-
lips (SP) and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) 
tests. When looking at the results of the log of net state 
domestic product per capita figures relative to the seven 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics of NSDP per capita figures for the period 1980–1981 to 2014–2015
Source Authors’ calculation based on figures from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India
NSDP per capita Observations Mean Standard deviations Minimum Maximum Skewness Coefficient of variation
Arunachal Pradesh 35 19,188.82849 9594.971511 7282.99953 37,683.26076 0.655032246 1.999883843
Assam 35 14,598.97252 4289.373049 9461.295236 23,967.6814 0.791402205 3.403521297
Manipur 35 14,027.0661 5394.757087 7998.815489 24,909.83394 0.647099031 2.600129324
Meghalaya 35 17,847.54908 9462.605662 8365.095824 39,503.32339 0.831936796 1.886113584
Mizoram 35 20,426.82133 10,482.40927 8017.290144 43,161.78964 0.832335461 1.948676187
Nagaland 35 22,603.36894 13,625.60995 8325.076785 51,887.58685 0.939789234 1.658888594
Tripura 35 18,250.64725 13,324.29861 5563.050385 50,753.83026 0.96555636 1.369726676
Seven states popula-
tion Weighted 
Average
35 15,722.1513 6148.528993 8903.801933 29,456.69734 0.842821985 2.557058984
Indian average 35 20,904.237 9072.422285 10,712.21282 40,632.81559 0.842066562 2.304151674
Table 3  Results of Augmented Dicky–Fuller (ADF), Phillips–Perron (PP), Schmidt–Phillips (SP) and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin 
(KPSS) tests for ln(NSDPPC) relative to the Seven-State population weighted average
Source: Authors’ estimations
For the ADF test lags selected using Akaike Information Criterion
For the PP and KPSS test the Newey–West automatic bandwidth selected using Bartlett Kernel
All the tests include a trend and intercept
For all the tests the null hypothesis is that the series contains a unit root, except for KPSS, where the null is that the series has no unit root
***1% significance, **5% significance, *10% significance
ln(NSDPPC) ADF test PP test KPSS test SP test
State ADF test statistic Lags PP test statistic Bandwidth KPSS test statistic Bandwidth SP test statistic
Arunachal Pradesh − 3.067064 4 − 2.05285 4 0.114763 4 − 2.118517
Assam − 3.359912* 0 − 3.361715* 1 0.161700** 4 − 2.089148
Manipur − 2.768257 0 − 2.64759 5 0.079084 2 − 2.689235
Meghalaya − 4.596505*** 0 − 4.606717*** 2 0.098335 3 − 2.07591
Mizoram − 3.599768** 1 − 1.81678 11 0.124551* 3 − 2.412563
Nagaland − 2.403929 0 − 2.40393 0 0.088938 4 − 2.44021
Tripura − 3.904149** 0 − 3.904149** 0 0.098645 4 − 1.608344
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states’ population weighted average, the null hypothesis of a 
unit root can be rejected for four states when using the ADF 
test (Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura), for three 
states using the PP test (Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura) 
and for no states based on the results of SP test. In the case 
of the KPSS test, where the null is formulated such that its 
rejection indicates the presence of a unit root, we find that 
we can reject the null of stationarity in the cases of two 
states (Assam and Mizoram).
Table 4 presents the results of the conventional unit root 
tests when our variables of interest are the natural log of state 
incomes per capita relative to the Indian average, as well as 
the natural log of the seven states’ population weighted aver-
age income per capita relative to the Indian average. We find 
that the null of a unit root can be rejected for three states 
based on the ADF test (Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura), 
for two states based on the PP test (Meghalaya and Tripura), 
and for two states based on the SP test (Manipur and Mizo-
ram). Meanwhile only two states, Meghalaya and Nagaland, 
rejects the null of stationarity with the KPSS test. When 
examining the natural log of the seven states’ population 
weighted average income per capita relative to the Indian 
average, it is apparent that all the four tests provide evidence 
of divergence of the region’s income per capita from that of 
the national average. Based on the results of the preceding 
tests, we find evidence of stochastic divergence of incomes 
with some moderate evidence of income convergence for 
specific tests.
We now turn to the results from the unit root tests with 
break(s). Since our relative income series spans 35 years in 
total, a period which includes both a phase of wide-reaching 
economic reforms in the 1990s, including the initiation and 
formulation of the LEP and more systematic (albeit gradual 
and incremental) implementation of the development agenda 
of the LEP for the benefit of the NER in the 2000s, therefore 
the presence of structural breaks is to be expected. If we 
were to ignore such structural breaks in our data, then we 
could erroneously conclude in favour of stochastic diver-
gence of per capita incomes, as suggested by our previous 
results. Our preferred tests are the ones developed by Lee 
and Strazicich (2003, 2004, hereafter LS2 and LS1, respec-
tively), which endogenously determine one (in the LS1 test) 
and two (in the LS2 test) structural break(s) in intercept and 
slope. In contrast to earlier tests, the size properties of the 
LS1 and LS2 tests are unaffected by breaks under the null, 
which means that these tests are not subject to rejections of 
the null in the presence of a unit root with break(s). Conse-
quently, the rejection of the null in favour of trend-stationar-
ity with one/two break(s) unambiguously implies stochastic 
convergence (see Chapters 4 and 5 in Choudhury 2012).
The LS2 test was carried out first for all the variables 
because of the two distinct phases of policy changes, 
the1990s and 2000s. Due to the relatively short time period 
of 35 years, we would not expect more than two breaks.10 
Results from the LS2 tests are presented in Table 5. We find 
that every state rejects the null of a unit root when using 
per capita income figures relative to the seven states popu-
lation weighted average income per capita suggesting the 
Table 4  Results of Augmented Dicky–Fuller (ADF), Phillips–Perron (PP), Schmidt–Phillips (SP) and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin 
(KPSS) tests for ln(NSDPPC) relative to the Indian average
Source Authors estimations
For the ADF test lags selected using Akaike Information Criterion
For the PP and KPSS test the Newey–West automatic bandwidth selected using Bartlett Kernel
All the tests include a trend and intercept
For all the tests the null hypothesis is that the series contains a unit root, except for KPSS, where the null is that the series has no unit root
***1% significance, **5% significance, *10% significance
ln(NSDPPC) ADF test PP test KPSS test SP test
State ADF test statistic Lags PP test statistic Bandwidth KPSS test statistic Bandwidth SP test statistic
Arunachal Pradesh − 2.661327 0 − 2.66948 1 0.084375 4 − 2.640443
Assam − 3.085552 0 − 3.08555 0 0.071111 2 − 2.707008
Manipur − 3.000935 0 − 3.05196 2 0.080964 3 − 3.013026*
Meghalaya − 3.687898** 0 − 3.603134** 3 0.124760* 3 − 2.640878
Mizoram − 4.13877** 2 − 3.1687 33 0.086183 3 − 3.062182*
Nagaland − 2.515216 0 − 2.51522 0 0.119935* 4 − 2.534223
Tripura − 3.32167* 0 − 3.32167* 0 0.108496 4 − 1.774905
Seven-state Population 
Weighted Average
− 2.720182 0 − 2.70595 1 0.119506* 3 − 2.740361
10 We only undertook the LS1 test when one of the break dates iden-
tified by the LS2 test was statistically insignificant.
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stochastic convergence of incomes for each state to the NER 
as a whole. Additionally, the unit root null is rejected for all 
states when using per capita income figures relative to the 
national average income per capita providing evidence on 
stochastic convergence of state incomes to the Indian aver-
age. We also find that the two break dates were statistically 
significant at 10% or better levels of significance in all but 
two cases. The two series where one of the breaks was insig-
nificant are the natural log of NSDP per capita relative to 
the seven states population weighted average for Arunachal 
Pradesh, and the natural log of NSDP per capita relative to 
the Indian average for Nagaland. For these series, we addi-
tionally carry out the LS1 test, also shown in Table 5, and we 
find that the Arunachal Pradesh series no longer rejects the 
unit root null, and the break date is insignificant, whilst the 
Nagaland series still rejects the null and the sole break date 
is significant. When we turn our attention to the natural log 
of the seven states population weighted average per capita 
income relative to the Indian average, we find that the null 
is rejected by the LS2 test, with both the break dates being 
statistically significant.
Our results provide firm evidence in favour of the hypoth-
esis that stochastic convergence of incomes per capita has 
occurred within the Seven Sisters, and in relation to the rest 
of India, between 1980 and 2014. Based on the seven-state 
series, the unit root null for the log of relative real income 
per capita to the population weighted average income per 
capita is rejected in each case by using the two-break LM 
unit root tests. We also reject the unit root null when consid-
ering the log of relative real income per capita to the Indian 
average income for all seven states. Additionally, we find 
that the series comprising the natural log of the seven states 
population weighted average income per capita relative to 
the Indian average income per capita, also rejects the unit 
root null when we apply the two-break LM unit root test, 
thus implying that the region as a whole is converging to the 
national average in terms of incomes per capita.
Our analysis presents strong evidence that the real income 
per capita across Seven Sisters have stochastically con-
verged to their own ‘compensating differentials’ between 
1980 and 2014. The conditional convergence of inter-state 
income per capita across Seven Sisters vis-à-vis the ‘com-
pensating differentials’ suggests that market-oriented poli-
cies and associated development initiatives proved effective 
in reducing regional inequality. The fact that these states 
also conditionally converged to their ‘compensating differ-
entials’, with respect to the Indian average, imply that the 
macro reforms of the 1990s and the directed development 
Table 5  Results from the Lee 
and Strazicich 2-break and 
1-break test
Source Authors estimations
Lags selected with the general to specific approach from a maximum of 8. Critical value for a two-tailed 
test with 30 df is 1.697, and n denotes a non-significant break. Null hypothesis of unit root
We only undertook the LS1 test when one of the breaks from the LS2 test was insignificant
***1% significance, **5% significance, *10% significance
State LS2 test LS1 test
LS2 test statistic Lags Break 1 Break 2 LS1 test statistic Lags Break
ln(NSDPPC) relative to seven-state population weighted average
 Arunachal Pradesh − 9.082*** 8 1995n 2002 − 4.1759 7 2006n
 Assam − 5.5556* 8 1994 2002
 Manipur − 6.2148** 8 1991 2007
 Meghalaya − 5.8031** 7 1993 2005
 Mizoram − 6.6459*** 6 1991 2007
 Nagaland − 9.4951*** 8 1997 2002
 Tripura − 6.2259** 6 1991 2005
ln(NSDPPC) relative to the Indian average
 Arunachal Pradesh − 6.571*** 2 1995 2003
 Assam − 5.7126** 6 1993 1999
 Manipur − 5.4831* 2 1997 2009
 Meghalaya − 6.0256** 8 1991 2007
 Mizoram − 7.7557*** 6 1993 1999
 Nagaland − 10.21*** 8 1997n 2002 − 4.9967** 4 2002
 Tripura − 9.9711*** 8 1992 2002
 Seven-state popula-
tion weighted 
average
− 8.1409*** 6 1993 1999
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policies post 1991, albeit implemented haphazardly, resulted 
in economic recovery. The ethical dimension inherent in the 
implementation of the LEP generated economic momen-
tum for the NER as a whole, which in turn stochastically 
converged towards the rest of India in terms of income per 
capita. Significantly, the presence of statistically significant 
structural breaks identified by our testing procedure indi-
cates that during the period under consideration, two shifts 
took place which permanently affected most states’ and the 
region’s ‘compensating differentials’. A possible explana-
tion for this is that the significant economic reforms and 
directed regional development policy taking place at the 
time altered the relative levels of investment and technol-
ogy in the affected states. We attribute the first break to the 
macro and structural reforms (trade liberalisation, industrial 
reforms and delicensing as part of the pro-market reforms) 
implemented in the 1990s, and the second break as a con-
sequence of the LEP’s domestic market-oriented policies 
tailored to enhance the connectivity of the local economy 
with regional, national and international markets. Obvi-
ously, the impact of policy on relative income series for each 
state differs because of heterogeneous individual dynamics, 
resulting in leads and lags in the break dates. The fact that 
each series has two statistically significant breaks (with the 
exception of Arunachal Pradesh relative to the NER average 
and Nagaland relative to Indian average) corroborates the 
above explanation.
The implication of our findings in terms of the ethical 
dimension of the PMO is that the government of India, 
despite regime changes11, was able to make progress in its 
developmental goals for the NER as envisioned in the LEP 
through gradual and incremental engagement with one of 
the key stakeholders (e.g. state governments). The over-
whelming evidence of income convergence of the Seven 
Sisters with each other, as well as of the region with the 
national average, suggests that the LEP achieved its stated 
internal aim of elevating the economy of the NER and its 
growth trajectory, to bring it up to par with the rest of the 
country. There was an active attempt by the government of 
India to engage with stakeholders, including state govern-
ments, the NEC and the local populace. It was also able 
to engage with macro-level stakeholders like foreign gov-
ernments, especially in the form of economic cooperation 
with Myanmar and political cooperation with Bangladesh, 
facilitating the creation of commercial links between the 
north-eastern states and these Southeast Asian countries, 
which has also greatly benefitted the income generation 
capacity of the NER states. There is evidence that whilst 
the share of agriculture and allied activities has declined, 
the industrial and services sectors have both increased in 
all seven states between 2010–2011 and 2013–2014 (Salve 
and Pandit 2016).
Limitations and Further Research
Our findings lend support to our earlier contention that the 
ethical dimension in PMO has the power to curtail unethi-
cal practices and behaviour. In fact, the GOI, via means of 
the LEP, did attempt to reverse the ‘neglect’ the NER had 
faced due to ill-conceived policies, albeit in an unfocussed and 
haphazard way. As such, at the macro-level, we find evidence 
for per capita income convergence, which implies that the 
standard of living is improving on average. However, micro-
level aspects such as the LEP’s impact in ameliorating the 
rural–urban disparities can only be understood in sufficient 
depth with additional, longitudinal/ethnographic qualitative 
research focusing on both managers and consumers of policy 
outcomes. Dholakia (2012) observes that in India, fields like 
marketing and management suffer from the lack of a critical 
perspective as the tendency is towards the “… silencing of 
local subaltern stakeholders’’ (Varman and Saha 2009, p. 811, 
cited in Dholakia). Thus, we identify this gap as a significant 
area for future studies to address: to map accurately the micro-
level impact of the LEP, and how these lessons can inform the 
Indian Government’s Act East Policy, launched in 2014 at the 
India-ASEAN Summit in Myanmar, to replace the LEP.
Further, the application of marketing tenets to the politi-
cal domain is not without limitations. For instance, the 
underlying exchange interactions in the political context 
are often non-reciprocal and involve public goods, plus 
demonstrate a far more complex morphology in compari-
son with commercial exchanges (Henneberg 2002). Whilst 
the nature of political offering is essentially intangible or 
promise-based (Scammell 1999), political marketing activi-
ties can take an ugly turn, due to an emphasis on negative 
campaigns designed to belittle other parties’ achievements 
(O’Shaughnessy 2002). Whilst these differences do not ren-
der the use of marketing concepts in a political context extra-
neous, they do necessitate a careful adaptation.
Additionally, the empirical findings in this paper provide 
statistical evidence of income convergence for the states in 
India’s NER to the region as a whole and to the national 
average implying falling regional income disparity. We 
attempt to correlate this result to policy changes in the 1990s 
11 The LEP was developed and enacted during the Congress-led gov-
ernment of Prime Minister (PM) P.V. Narsimha Rao (1991–1996) 
and rigorously pursued by coalition-led United Front PM H. D. Deve 
Gowda (1996–1997) followed by I.K. Gujral (1997–1998). The Bhar-
tiya Janta Party (BJP)-led government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
(1998–2004) and the successive Congress-led governments of PM 
Manmohan Singh (1998–2004) and (2004–2014) continued with eco-
nomic liberalisation along with focusing on forging close economic 
and commercial ties, increasing strategic and security cooperation 
with neighbours.
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and 2000s, and conclude that the presence of two structural 
breaks—one in the 1990s and one in the 2000s for most 
states—provide evidence to our hypothesis that the reforms 
and initiation of LEP in the 1990s and the implementation 
of development instruments of LEP in the 2000s, embodying 
PPMO and RPMO, respectively, have resulted in improved 
economic performance of the Seven Sister states and the 
NER as a whole. In this sense, our income growth empir-
ics identify three policy regimes for each state and for the 
NER as a whole. The first regime between 1980 and the 
first structural break date capture relative income dynamics 
during a period that was characterised by a policy void. The 
second regime between the first and second break dates coin-
cides with a period that saw unprecedented market-oriented 
reforms throughout India (1990s) and the initiation of the 
LEP. The third regime between the second break date and 
2014 coincides with a period that saw intensified imple-
mentation of the development instruments of the LEP in the 
2000s (see Fig. 3 for a visual exposition with a hypothetical 
relative income per capita series).
Our attempt is therefore limited to using the ethical 
dimension in the PMO framework to understand the regional 
impact and domestic dimension of the LEP on the North-
Eastern states of India, through testing for regional income 
convergence and identifying three distinct policy regimes 
(by identifying two state-specific structural breaks endog-
enously) that account for the observed growth patterns of 
relative incomes per capita. Whilst we examine how policy 
changes can potentially balance (or polarise) cross-regional 
growth, we do recognise that there is more to simply ana-
lysing regional income convergence. However, our paper 
does not identify the nexus of causal channels through 
which reforms and specific policy changes affect the overall 
regional income distribution. Such a task is not impossible, 
but it is definitely complicated and will require both a quan-
tification of the development instruments of the LEP and a 
micro-level household and/or firm-level survey data to fully 
capture the LEP’s impact on the NER’s communities and 
businesses, an area that we intend to explore in our future 
work. It may be argued that the annual data that we use in 
this paper are low frequency, and to that extent, it can be 
construed as a limitation of the paper. However, we have 35 
annual observations for each time-series spanning over three 
and half decades of policy changes, which is considered rich 
both from a developing country perspective as well from a 
statistical estimation perspective.12 Overall, our main focus 
in this paper has been to identify potential correlates, using 
a unified analytical framework that combines the theoretical 
context informed by the ethical dimension in the PMO with 
the empirical approach embedded in work on income con-
vergence from the regional economics literature. Together, 
they allow us to offer distinctive insights into the impact of 
Fig. 3  Structural breaks and 
policy regimes. Source Authors’ 
construction
12 Our use of annual data for the kind of time-series analysis that we 
have undertaken, identifying structural breaks endogenously from the 
data and attributing them to different policy regimes, is in line with 
other published work in the context of India—see, for instance, Chat-
terji and Choudhury (2013), among others. Chatterji and Choudhury 
(2013) used 31 annual observations to identify two structural breaks 
in their examination of the inter-industry wage structure in India in 
the context of gradual and incremental reforms.
The Ethical Dimension in Political Market Orientation: A Framework for Evaluating the Impact…
1 3
the LEP on regional convergence of incomes in the NER 
and analyse the observed regional income growth patterns.
Conclusions
In sum, we reiterate that the dynamics of income conver-
gence in the NER underline the positive outcomes of the 
LEP. Our analysis points out clearly that the seven states 
in the NER have converged to the rest of India both indi-
vidually and as a region since 1980 in terms of incomes 
per capita. Using stationarity tests that allow to account for 
structural breaks in time-series data on income per capita 
for 35 years, we conclude that stochastic convergence of 
incomes per capita across the seven NER states as well as 
the region as a whole to that of the national average has 
taken place. It can be argued that at the macro-level, there 
is a shift towards an equitable regional income distribution 
in the NER, thus suggesting fall in regional inequality. This 
assessment was undertaken against the backdrop of decades 
of targeted regional economic policy, marketed by the GOI 
as part of its flagship LEP and more recently Act East policy 
(AEP), both of which support the NER’s capacity to serve as 
India’s gateway to the Southeast Asia region. The evidence 
lends support to the conjecture that despite its limitations, 
the LEP was able to positively impact on the socio-economic 
policy-making processes and contributed to income conver-
gence in the Seven Sisters.
A key statistical contribution of our work is that we let 
the data speak and endogenously determine two structural 
breaks from long time-series data, rather than specifying an 
exogenous break based on historic and theoretical conjec-
tures. Thus, through our conceptual framework that links 
the PMO with time-series evidence, we illustrate how macro 
reforms and the initiation of the LEP in the 1990s, together 
with the intensified implementation of the development 
agenda of the LEP in the 2000s, have brought about income 
convergence in the NER. Reform processes are incremen-
tal and gradual in nature and have heterogeneous effects on 
states, as our findings demonstrate via the identification of 
two state-specific structural breaks, which coincide with the 
two distinct policy regimes of the 1990s and 2000s.
Broadly, this study contributes to the emerging literature 
on the PMO within the political marketing domain, focusing 
on how the dynamism of market-oriented policies derives 
from complex interface between different stakeholders 
(Lees-Marshment 2001; Ormrod 2007). By focusing on the 
ethical dimension in PMO (and two related sub-constructs 
of PPMO and RPMO), we argue that it can be a source of 
competitive advantage, as by linking with the complex needs 
of different stakeholders, market-oriented policies like the 
LEP can bring about lasting change. There has been little 
attention paid to the interplay between heterogeneous stake-
holders tackling market-oriented economic reforms at dif-
ferent institutional levels in the NER. Hence, empirically 
this study is one of the first to examine how the LEP and 
concurrent economic change occurred through the interplay 
of (i) the shared vision and values of macro-level stakehold-
ers; (ii) meso-level bodies (e.g. those operating at the State 
and District levels) that interpreted and implemented reform-
oriented policies; and (iii) the adoption of new practices, 
expectations and behaviours at the micro-level. It is clear 
that the LEP acted as a shock to the existing economic sys-
tem, as is evident from the presence of statistically signifi-
cant structural breaks identified by our testing procedure, 
indicating that during the period under consideration, two 
state-specific shifts to relative incomes per capita took place, 
which permanently affected most states’ and the region’s 
‘compensating differentials’.
Das (2010) suggests that whilst India’s Northeast, South 
Asia and South-East Asia might have remained politically 
separate, in the light of changing economic realities, they 
have the potential to coalesce into a composite region of 
‘Northeast India, South and South East Asia’ (NISASEA) 
along the lines of the European Union. Indeed, a number 
of recent developments in the NER indicate how it is being 
rebranded in this manner, to enable it to contribute to the 
restoration of greater integration in the region (Bhattacharjee 
2016). Our findings indicate clearly that regional inequality 
reduced both within the NER, as well as between the NER 
and the national average between 1980 and 2014, aided by 
the launch of fundamental economic reforms that spanned 
the full length of the LEP and directed regional development 
policy as part of the broader LEP. The current government 
seeks to develop the NER through greater economic inte-
gration with Southeast Asia via a Natural Economic Zone. 
Given the contiguous landscape and common lifestyles that 
people across overlapping borders share, this does not seem 
far-fetched. However, for the region to emerge as a strategic 
stakeholder in sustaining the dynamism and processes of 
the free market, the AEP will need to consciously work at 
being inclusive. Hitherto, the framework of reform has been 
conceived from the statist perspective, which widens the gap 
between different stakeholders (Ziipao 2018).
In closing, we underline that the significance of our 
study lies in its illustration of how commercial marketing 
vocabulary can contribute to an analytical understanding 
of increasingly market-driven and yet surprisingly ethical 
policy-making processes. Indeed, empirical evidence emerg-
ing from stochastic convergence of incomes per capita for 
the Seven Sister states of the NER in India well illustrates 
how regional economic inequality can be reduced through 
targeted market-oriented policies.
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